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 OPINION 
                      
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.  
          
 Plaintiffs in this consolidated appeal contest the amount of 
attorney’s fees awarded by the district court pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.  Specifically, they contend that the district 
court erred in finding $150 to be the reasonable hourly rate for 
the services provided by their attorney, rather than the $210 per 
hour rate they requested.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the judgments of the district court and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 I. 
 Plaintiffs Vernita Smith and Carmen Rivera are indigent 
tenants of defendant Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”).  
Each commenced an action in the district court pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 
et seq., in order to enforce administrative grievance awards 
previously issued in their favor pursuant to 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-
.57.  Smith’s award required the PHA to make certain repairs to 
her rental unit.  Rivera’s award provided for a rent abatement 
and a rollback of a rent increase imposed by the PHA.  Both Smith 
and Rivera were represented by Michael Donahue, Esq., of 
Community Legal Services (“CLS”) of Philadelphia.  It is not 
disputed that Smith and Rivera were each a “prevailing party” in 
their respective lawsuits, within the meaning of § 1988. 
  
 
 3 
 Plaintiffs petitioned the court for attorney’s fees pursuant 
to § 1988, requesting an hourly rate of $210.  In support of 
their petitions, plaintiffs each submitted two affidavits, one 
from Donahue and one from Lorrie McKinley.  McKinley is Project 
Head of the Employment Law Project at CLS and Chair of the CLS 
Attorneys Fees Committee, which establishes the usual billing 
rates for CLS counsel.  Donahue’s affidavit noted that he has 
been a member of the federal bar since 1978, and has litigated 
over 200 cases involving the federal housing regulations, 
including ten class actions and four successful appeals in this 
Court.1  Donahue averred that $210 per hour is a reasonable 
market rate for the services he rendered. 
 McKinley’s affidavit stated that she has been practicing law 
since 1984 and is familiar with the market rates for civil rights 
attorneys in the Philadelphia area.  It stated that Donahue’s 
usual hourly rate is $210, and that this rate is consistent with 
the rates for attorneys of similar experience and skill in civil 
rights matters in Philadelphia.  The latter statement is based on 
the CLS schedule of rates, which in turn is “based upon a survey 
of hourly rates charged by private law firms and individual 
practitioners in Philadelphia.”  App. at 38. 
 In both cases, the PHA objected to the proposed hourly rate 
because it was higher than the rate awarded Donahue in similar 
prior cases, but it offered no affidavits to support its 
position.  The PHA did not object to the McKinley affidavit, but 
                     
     
1That number has since grown to five.  See Farley v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 102 F.3d 697 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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it contested the propriety and reliability of the underlying fee 
schedule and survey.  Without holding evidentiary hearings, the 
district court set the hourly rate at $150 in both cases.  The 
court cited opinions in prior cases in which Donahue had 
represented plaintiffs in actions brought pursuant to the Housing 
Act, and in which the court had set Donahue’s rate at $150 per 
hour.  This consolidated appeal followed. 
 II. 
 The reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees is 
reviewed pursuant to an “abuse of discretion” standard.  See 
Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 
1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1996); Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1509 
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 754 (1997); 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).  “[A]n 
attorney’s marketplace billing rate is a factual question which 
is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review.”  
Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035; see Student Pub. Interest Research 
Group v. AT & T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1442 (3d Cir. 1988).  
The question of whether the district court applied the 
appropriate standards and procedures in determining attorney’s 
fees is a legal question subject to plenary review.  See 
Washington, 89 F.3d at 1034-35; Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 
983 F.2d 459, 472 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Generally, “a reasonable hourly rate is calculated according 
to the prevailing market rates in the community.”  Washington, 89 
F.3d at 1035; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n.11, 104 
S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984).  “[A] district court may not set 
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attorneys’ fees based upon a generalized sense of what is 
customary or proper, but rather must rely upon the record.”  
Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1510 (emphasis added); see Cunningham v. City 
of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1986).  The plaintiff 
bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence of what 
constitutes a reasonable market rate for the essential character 
and complexity of the legal services rendered in order to make 
out a prima facie case.  See Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035.  Once 
the plaintiff has carried this burden, defendant may contest that 
prima facie case only with appropriate record evidence.  See id. 
at 1036; Cunningham, 807 F.2d at 52-53.  In the absence of such 
evidence, the plaintiff must be awarded attorney’s fees at her 
requested rate.  See Washington, 89 F.3d at 1036; Cunningham, 807 
F.2d at 52-53; Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 
F.2d 713, 720 (3d Cir. 1989).  If hourly rates are disputed, the 
district court must conduct a hearing to determine the reasonable 
market rates.  See Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1510; Rode, 892 F.2d at 
1183. 
 The PHA urges that the McKinley affidavit fails to establish 
$210 as a reasonable hourly rate because the survey upon which it 
is ultimately based is flawed.2  The McKinley affidavit is based 
                     
     
2The PHA now contests the validity of the McKinley affidavit 
on the additional ground that, while McKinley was never retained 
by plaintiffs, she and Donahue worked for the same organization.  
The Supreme Court has stated that “the fee applicant [must] 
produce satisfactory evidence -- in addition to the attorney’s own 
affidavits -- that the requested rates are in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”  Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 
(1984)(emphasis added); see also In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423-
24 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  Because the PHA did not raise this 
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in part on CLS’s hourly fee schedule, which in turn is based on a 
survey of private firms in Philadelphia.  The PHA argues that 
this underlying survey is insufficient to establish $210 per hour 
as a reasonable market rate for a Housing Act case insofar as the 
survey fails to differentiate among different types of 
litigation.  Rather, the survey apparently establishes a single 
schedule of rates for litigation involving such diverse matters 
as employment discrimination, landlord-tenant law, criminal law, 
corporate law, divorce law, and labor law.  See Evans v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., Civ. A. No. 93-5547, 1995 WL 154872, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1995) (discussing same survey), aff’d 
sub nom Smith v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 79 F.3d 1139 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  Therefore, the PHA contends, the survey is 
unreliable and cannot form the basis for the plaintiffs’ prima 
facie case. 
 Our review is hampered both by the fact that the parties 
have not included the survey as part of the record on appeal and 
by the district court’s failure to address directly the survey 
evidence.  Rather, in Smith, the court simply stated: 
This Court determines . . . that $150.00 per 
hour, not $210.00 per hour, is a reasonable 
rate.  In reaching this conclusion, this 
Court adopts the reasoning of four District 
Court Judges in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, all of whom recently found 
$150.00 per hour to be a reasonable rate for 
Mr. Donahue’s services in representing 
tenants in actions against the Philadelphia 
Housing Authority and all of whom were 
affirmed on appeal . . . . 
 
                                                                  
issue 
below, we decline to address it here. 
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Smith v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 94-7284, slip op. at 5 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996) (citing, inter alia, Evans, 1995 WL 
154872; Clark v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 93-4890, 1995 WL 
129208 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1995), aff’d sub nom Smith v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 79 F.3d 1139 (3d Cir. 1996); Jenkins 
v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 94-5475, 1995 WL 105479 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 10, 1995), aff’d sub nom Smith v. Philadelphia Housing 
Auth., 79 F.3d 1139 (3d Cir. 1996); Smith v. Philadelphia Housing 
Auth., No. 94-0147, 1994 WL 376874 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1994)).  
The Rivera court’s analysis was even more cursory, stating only 
that Donahue’s “rate of $210 per hour for the type of services 
rendered is excessive,” Rivera v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 
95-7658, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1996), and that “[t]he 
court finds [$150 per hour to be] reasonable and consistent with 
recent decisions by th[e] court which have rejected Mr. Donahue’s 
requested rate.”  Id. slip op. at 2 (citing Clark, 1995 WL 
129208). 
 By contrast to the cases cited by the district court, the 
plaintiffs cite a number of district court cases that have 
accepted the CLS schedule.  See, e.g., Rainey v. Philadelphia 
Housing Auth., 832 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Swaayze v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., Civ. A. No. 91-2982, 1992 WL 81598, 
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1992); Higgins v. Philadelphia Gas 
Works, 54 B.R. 928, 938 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
 We decline to address whether the CLS schedule and the 
survey that undergirds it are sufficiently reliable and adequate 
given that this issue was not addressed by the district court in 
  
 
 8 
the first instance.  As this Court recently reaffirmed, “[t]he 
matter of an attorney’s marketplace billing rate is a factual 
question.”  Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035.  The district court may 
not dispose of such a factual question “based upon a generalized 
sense of what is customary or proper, but rather must rely upon 
the record.”  Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1510.  By simply relying on the 
hourly rate set by the court for Mr. Donahue in previous cases in 
which he has appeared, the district court failed to exercise its 
responsibility, as set forth by us most recently in Washington 
and Coleman, to settle upon a reasonable hourly rate based solely 
upon a factual record.  We therefore will remand these matters so 
that the district court in each case may construct an adequate 
record to justify an award of attorney’s fees at a particular 
rate. 
 On remand, the district court should determine whether the 
plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case.  The answer to this question will in large part 
hinge on whether the CLS fee schedule, and the underlying survey, 
are sufficiently reliable to form the basis of McKinley’s 
affidavit testimony.  See FED. R. EVID. 703; In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 747-49 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1253 (1995).  Plaintiffs will have the 
opportunity to submit any additional evidence they believe to be 
appropriate.  The PHA may continue to rely simply on its 
contention that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case that $210 is a reasonable hourly 
fee, and rest solely on “answers or briefs”.  Bell, 884 F.2d at 
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720.  Alternatively, it may choose to supplement this legal 
argument by adducing evidence to dispute the affidavit testimony 
submitted by the plaintiffs.  If the PHA raises a factual issue 
as to the reasonableness of Donahue’s requested rate, it “must 
introduce [evidence] upon which the challenge is based.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).3 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district 
court will be vacated and these matters remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 Costs taxed against appellees. 
 
 
 
 
                     
     
3We express no opinion as to whether $150 or $210, or some 
other figure, represents a reasonable hourly billing rate for Mr. 
Donahue’s services in this matter. 
